I am happy to have been invited to speak on this issue at your conference this morning because, in preparing this paper, I have been obliged to consider once again the very complex question of Irish neutrality in the wider context of Ireland’s membership of the European Union, and its emerging Security and Defence policy.

I am the Defence Spokesperson of the Irish Green Party. Like many other people who are interested in the subject of Irish neutrality, I find myself in regular debates on the subject with those who dismiss the idea that Irish neutrality is a credible concept, and indeed who often denounce the very notion of neutrality as morally indefensible.

So I think it’s important to begin this morning with a renewed attempt to define what it is we mean by neutrality, and to examine what popular understandings of Irish neutrality are in this country. This is particularly necessary as we face into a second referendum campaign on the Lisbon Treaty this autumn and the issue of our neutrality is likely to feature prominently in the public debate surrounding it..

The only internationally recognised legal definition of neutrality is that laid out in the customary international law of the Hague Conventions of 1907. The legal definition provided differentiates neutrality from most other foreign and security-policy concepts. According to the conventions, neutral states are required not to participate in wars either directly or indirectly. They should not support or favour war parties with military forces. Nor should they make their territory available to them, supply them with weapons or credits, or restrict private weapons exports in a one-sided way. Neutrals are also required to defend themselves against violations of their neutrality. So-called ‘permanently’ neutral states must conduct a foreign and security policy enabling them to remain neutral in a potential conflict; they should not take part in a military alliance or allow foreign powers to establish military bases on their territory, and they should possess adequate military forces.

Some of the academic literature on the subject of neutrality has made an interesting differentiation between what is seen as the narrower legal dimension of neutrality and the fuller political concept of neutrality. It is argued that in order to understand the deeper meaning of neutrality, it is necessary to be aware of its roots. Neutrality as a foreign and security policy concept is seen to have originated at the same time as the concept of state sovereignty, which dates from the end of the Middle Ages. Sovereignty meant authority over all matters, and foremost the rights of states to wage war whenever they thought this would fit their interests. Additionally, neutrality represented the right of states to abstain from war whenever this seemed to better fit their interests. Its original purpose therefore was to help states defend their interests in an international environment marked by conflicts. Therefore one of the important political functions of neutrality was its guarantee of a country’s political independence. Neutrality also had to enable a country to maintain its basic trade relationships during times of war. However, beside these realistic functions, neutrality is also seen to have an idealistic side, which is held to have originated from neutral state’s renunciation of their own military power projection, and from their commitment to restrict and regulate the use of force in international relations (Joenniemi, 1993:289). During World War I the Swiss elaborated the concept of neutrality from non-participation and impartiality to the vocation of justice and arbitration. Switzerland, standing aside from major power rivalries, was seen as a country entrusted with an active role and a moral obligation to establish justice, law and peace. Since then other neutral states have tried to underline their policy’s usefulness for the international system- they have seen themselves as uniquely qualified for arbitration and mediation duties as well as being initiators and bridge builders. A well-known example of this was the group of Neutral and Non-Aligned States (N+N) in the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), latterly known as the OSCE.

So where does Irish neutrality fit into all of this? Much modern history and politics literature on Irish neutrality suggests that Irelands ’security identity’ (ie its neutrality) is tied to a strong sense of nationalism, and independence from British hegemony. It has also been suggested that a British proposal to introduce conscription in Ireland during the First World War was a contributory factor that led to the Easter Rising. Many academics also recall the British government’s attempts to involve Ireland in the Second World War by floating reunification proposals that Eamon de Valera consistently refused. Robert Fisk dubbed Ireland’s neutrality in the Second World War “a publicly non-aligned independence that finally demonstrated the sovereignty of de Valera’s state and her break with the Empire” (Fisk 1983). The well known Irish historian Ronan Fanning claimed that “by the end of the second World War neutrality had become what it largely remains in the popular mind until today: the hallmark of independence, a badge of patriotic honour inextricably linked with the popular perception of Irish national identity”. (Fanning 1996: 137). More recent academic studies on the subject of Irish neutrality, however, differentiate between a ‘realist’ concept of Irish neutrality supported and promoted by successive Irish governments and a more active and broader public concept of Irish neutrality.

The realist concept of Irish neutrality, as reflected by government discourse, is seen to amount to a commitment to stay out of military alliances. Indeed, Garret Fitzgerald, a former Taoiseach and leader of the Fine Gael party stated “Irish neutrality is, of course, as the main political parties have made clear, military neutrality viz non-participation in a military alliance (1988:28).  The 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy made very clear that Ireland would not be seeking membership of NATO ot the Western European Union, or the assumption of their mutual defence guarantees (1996 : 147); this was because the then Irish government specified that as “both alliances contain in their founding Treaties provisions committing the parties to collective action in the event of armed attack against one or more of them” and membership of either would not be compatible with an intention to remain neutral” (Government of Ireland 1996:120). Another section of the White Paper on Foreign Policy concerning the Petersburg Tasks shows that the Irish Government viewed defence commitments of any kind under the WEU’s Treaty as having implications for the concept of military neutrality as it stated “Participation in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations through the WEU would not involve Ireland in defence commitments of any kind under the WEU Treaty and would not therefore have any implications for our policy of military neutrality”. The White Paper also stated that “our international reputation for impartiality has enabled us to play a meaningful role in the preservation of peace in the world”.

Critical social constructivist writers have argued that beliefs, identity and the agency of the public in foreign policy also provide a strong impulse to the maintenance of neutrality.  They point out that international relations realists such as Hans Morgenthau have ignored public opinion as a variable of foreign policy, believing the public to be ill-informed, inattentive and generally lacking the qualities needed to formulate “rational” foreign policy preferences (Morgenthau 1978). However, empirical analyses have found public opinion to be structured, “reflecting underlying values and beliefs”. Normative democratic theory also supports the view that citizens are a wise source of foreign policy, preventing foreign policy designed solely in the interests of elites and even restraining leader’s war-making proclivities (Holsti 1992).

Certainly in Ireland the public response to the requirement to ratify successive European Treaties over the years highlights the concerns that many people share over the threat that they believe deeper European integration poses to the policy of Irish neutrality. Despite the fact that most political parties, leaders and a majority of interests groups supported a “yes” vote in the first EU Nice Treaty referendum held in Ireland on June 7th 2001, the referendum proposal was defeated. This was in part because the voters who turned out perceived threats to Irish neutrality arising from the Treaty. In response the Irish Government asked the EU Heads of State to declare that the Nice Treaty did not affect Irish “military” neutrality and the government added a protocol promising to hold a referendum on joining a European Union military alliance in the future. In this instance the Irish public had a direct influence on international affairs in an attempt to maintain their conception of Irish neutrality. That conception of neutrality, although it is often difficult to capture, appears to reflect a belief in the force of law rather than the law of force, as well as a healthy suspicion of big post-imperial states. The foreign policy orientation that the Irish public appears to associate with neutrality includes peace-keeping, a general stance of anti-militarism, support for the peaceful resolution of disputes, pursuing disarmament and non-proliferation, the upholding of international law, the promotion of human security and human rights, and the resolution of justice and development issues etc. The ISPAS  or Irish Social and Attitudes Survey , conducted by the Economic and Social research Institute  in 2001/2002 on behalf of UCD?TCD Departments of Political Science/Politics showed that the most strongly supported public concepts of neutrality were those that resembled the wider “active” concept of neutrality that embodies characteristics such as peace promotion, nonaggression, the Primacy of the UN and the confinement of state military activity to UN peacekeeping, not being involved in wars and maintaining Ireland’s independence, identity and independent foreign policy making in (the context of big-power pressure).

And this brings us to the question of Ireland’s membership of the European Union and the public’s growing fears that as a supposedly ‘neutral’ country, we are allowing ourselves to become integrated into the security and defence structures that are emerging through the Union. Many Irish people have supported our membership of the EU to date because they have perceived it as a Peace Project, one that has delivered 50 years of peace on what was a divided continent. In the past there appeared to be little conflict between our membership of the European Union and the preservation and protection of Irish neutrality. Irish people are extremely supportive of the kind of “soft power” that the Union has been seen to use to date on the international stage – involving policy instruments such aid trade and diplomacy, in order to achieve its overall foreign policy objectives.  Furthermore of the 23 ESDP missions so far, less than one third, or seven, have been military peacekeeping operations. However the most recent European Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, which Irish people rejected in June 2008 during a popular referendum contains much more muscular Security and Defence provisions than did previous EU treaties. Firstly these Security and Defence provisions have been written in such way as to apply to both NATO Members (of whom there are 21) and the six neutral or non-aligned countries. There is no mention of neutrality in the treaty- the furthest it goes is to refer to the “specific character of particular member states”. There is a requirement in the treaty that member states unreservedly support the EU’s CFSP , and that they commit to progressively improve their military capabilities. There is an expansion of the Petersburg Tasks to which Ireland has signed up and the new tasks involve joint disarmament operations and combating terrorism in third countries. The treaty gives a legal basis to the European Defence Agency which, no matter what is one’s opinion of it, will certainly create and consolidate a European Armaments Industry. The new mechanism of Permament Structured Co-operation allows a group of member states who wish to go furthest in terms of developing their military equipment and capabilities to do so. The solidarity and mutual assistance clauses in the treaty also oblige all member states to go to each other’s assistance in the event of a natural disaster or a military attack, but does allow member states discretion as to what form that assistance should take. There is also the stated intention within the Lisbon Treaty that at some stage in the future the European Union shall develop a common defence policy. While this will require a referendum in Ireland, one can imagine how unenviable a position this country could find itself in, in the future if it were the only impediment to the creation of a European Common Defence that was supported by all other Member States. Outside of the Lisbon Treaty altogether there are also concerns about clear moves within the EU to further develop the existing relationship between NATO and the EU, making them ever more integrated, reducing duplication and creating permanent joint structures of co-operation, although respecting the independent nature of both organisations.

I need to begin winding up now but it is clear that Ireland’s position as a neutral member of the European Union is not an uncomplicated one. While we have adopted a somewhat “a la carte” approach to the ESDP policy to date, this may prove more difficult into the future as pressures grow for a more cohesive and unified foreign policy response across all EU Member States. Certainly there is nothing in the Lisbon Treaty that will legally oblige Ireland to participate in any mission or activity which its government does not support. However, as the missions become more militarily robust, as the scope of the EU’s interventions broadens to include, for example, peace-making and combating terrorism in third countries, Ireland may find it more difficult to continue insisting that it is a “neutral” country, certainly as it is perceived by the rest of the world. The differences that exist between popular and government understandings of Irish neutrality in this country may also prove problematic in the future. The popular conception of our neutrality appears to be much broader than the more minimalist government position of non-participation in military alliances. In fact, prominent members of one of the main political parties in Ireland have expressed their support for Ireland’s membership of NATO in the future and for its participation in an EU Common Defence arrangement. The discretion given to Irish government under the EU Treaties in the area of ESDP while to date has served our interests in many ways is also a major cause of concern for those who are committed to the protection of Irish neutrality.

On a personal note, and in conclusion, I feel that a wide-ranging, comprehensive and honest debate in this country on the subject of Irish neutrality is long overdue and is something that would help to clarify what our membership of the European Union is likely to mean for that position in the future. I believe that Ireland needs to have a clear and positive sense of our neutrality which could then be used to the advantage of the EU. As a traditionally neutral country free much of the colonial baggage that applies to other EU Member States, Ireland could be seen as a very important asset for the Union. Our experience of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland could be used to great effect by the EU in situations of international conflict. Ireland is also well-placed to encourage the EU to take more seriously issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, human security, diplomacy and conflict resolution.

Some authors on the subject of neutrality have suggested have suggested that whereas the legal definition of neutrality may have become an outdated one, that what has been called its “normative political core” remains valuable as a security identity. They have argued that as Europe today represents a region with an unknown degree of institutionalised co-operation among states which share their role as international actors, that neutrality’s main task today is not securing individual state sovereignty as it might have been in the past, but using neutrality’s beliefs for all of Europe. It is proposed that the central objectives of collective security and neutrality are similar as both aim to regulate and limit the use of force in interstate relations, and also to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts. They are seen to differ mainly in regard to the means favoured towards attaining these objectives: whereas collective security suggests active implication of all states, neutrality used to be based largely on individual abstention. The role that Ireland might play in using the values that have informed its security identity as a neutral country to promote collective security within the EU and internationally is something that should be included in any national debate on the issue of our neutrality.

Finally I think we are all aware that the future we face at an international level is an increasingly uncertain one. The issues of climate change, of competition over scarce resources, of Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism are all issues with which the EU and its Member States will have to grapple .Security emergencies within the EU in the future may make it very difficult for Ireland to try to maintain a so-called ‘neutral position’.  It is my hope that the moral authority which I believe Ireland has gained over the years due to its neutral status and proud record of UN peace-keeping will not be undermined over time due to our involvement in EU Security and Defence activities. Rather, I hope that a clear and positive sense of what our neutrality means will allow us to maintain that identity and those values both through times of peace and times of political and security turbulence within the EU and internationally. Thank you again for inviting me to speak her today and I look forward to questions afterwards.

Filed under:
Defence by Deirdre